

APPEAL NO. 040677  
FILED MAY 10, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on March 2, 2004. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on \_\_\_\_\_, and that the claimant had disability from January 27 through June 17, 2003. The appellant (carrier) appealed the hearing officer's injury and disability determinations on sufficiency of the evidence grounds and urged reversal. The claimant responded and urged affirmance.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

There was conflicting evidence presented on the disputed issues of injury and disability. The issues of injury and disability are questions of fact. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). The claimant testified that he was injured when he twisted his back while pushing a heavy mail cart onto a truck trailer on \_\_\_\_\_. The claimant's treating doctor, Dr. N, testified that, within reasonable medical probability, it is more likely than not that the way the claimant related the mechanism of injury is how it happened and that, from January 27, 2003, until she released him to full duty on June 18, 2003, the claimant was unable to work because of his work-related injury. The hearing officer noted that he found the treating doctor's and the claimant's testimony and medical documentation credible. An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard, we find no basis to reverse the hearing officer's resolution of the injury or disability issues.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY  
800 BRAZOS  
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

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Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Daniel R. Barry  
Appeals Judge

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Edward Vilano  
Appeals Judge